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The FIFA rule of non-interference was created undoubtedly with good intention, that is, for the 
betterment and development of football around the world by preventing governmental and 
political interference in football matters. However, this rule protects corrupt football officials 
because they cannot be summoned by the courts or governmental institutions of their own states 
to answer for their malpractices. As a result, the FIFA rule of non-interference contravenes 
national law. This dissertation aims to discuss how the FIFA rule of non-interference 
contributes to corruption and how it contravenes Kenyan law.  
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THE FIFA RULE OF NON-INTERFERENCE: HOW IT CONTRIBUTES 
TO CORRUPTION AND HOW IT CONTRAVENES KENYAN LAW. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Sport has gradually established itself as a big commercial enterprise in Africa.1 This growth is 
no surprise as sport throughout the world has faced notable commercialisation and estimations 
show that world sport now amounts to more than three per cent of world trade.2 As a result of 
this growth, development of sports as a commercial brand has arisen. Sporting programmes 
and events have now come to be huge brands bringing about great economic interest. 
Consequently, many persons who engage in sports do so not solely for leisure or the physical 
wellbeing it portends but as a full-fledged career or with this aim.3 Football (soccer) is the most 
played sport throughout Africa.4 The reality is that football has become a billion-dollar industry 
across the world but Africa remains at the periphery of this lucrative system.5 Africa’s problem 
springs from systematic and institutionalised problems associated with its football 
administration structures.6 Local clubs and leagues on the continent are predominantly run 
unprofessionally, with the exception of very few countries such as South Africa, and allegations 
of match-fixing are proliferate. Unprofessionally-run clubs and match-fixing allegations in the 
game complicate the situation further.7 African football is synonymous with corruption.8 The 
situation around the continent is reflected in Kenya where the tale of the game in the country 
                                                          
1 Razano F, ‘Keeping Sport out of the Courts: The National Soccer League Dispute Resolution Chamber - A 
Model for Sports Dispute Resolution in South Africa and Africa’ (2014). 
2 Gardiner S; O’leary J; Welch R; Boyes S and Naidoo U: Sports Law, 4th edn Routledge Oxford, 2012, 210. 
3 Omuojine K, ‘Legal Framework for Sports Development in Nigeria’ (2013). 
4 ‘5 Most Popular Sports in Africa’ http://www.africaranking.com/most-popular-sports-in-africa/2/. 
5 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football: Corruption and the (Under)Development of the Game in 
the Continent (2014). 
6 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
7 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
8 Rukuni, C; Groenink E: Killing Soccer in Africa. FAIR Transnational investigation pp.2  
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is full of dissension and complex problems involving rigging of elections, missing funds, 
leaders of football unions serving for decades, substandard infrastructure and poorly paid 
players.9 
Football Kenya Federation10 is the governing body of football in Kenya.11 FKF has been 
characterized by rampant corruption since its inception. While there many definitions of 
corruption, it may be viewed as the abuse of public office for personal gain.12 Serious 
allegations of corruption by FKF officials have been documented both locally and 
internationally.13 In 2013, it was alleged that money given to FKF by FIFA for development 
purposes was pocketed by FKF officials.14 In a research conducted by Transparency 
International in 2015,15 FKF scored zero points in a Transparency International Report for 
having no annual financial records, organisational charter, annual activity reports and a Code 
of Conduct available for public scrutiny on their website.16 
The major obstacle facing Kenya from combating corruption in football is FIFA’s rule on non-
interference.17 The FIFA statutes state that ‘each member shall manage its affairs independently 
                                                          
9 Oduor A, ‘REVEALED: Why most Kenyan players now prefer Zambian clubs to any African clubs’ Soka25 (23 
December 2015). http://www.soka25east.com/revealed-why-most-kenyan-players-now-prefer-zambian-clubs-to-
any-african-clubs/  See also Kwalimwa D, ‘Sam Nyamwea bows out from football administration’ Daily Nation 
(11 February 2016). http://www.nation.co.ke/sports/football/Sam-Nyamweya-bows-out-from-football-
administration/1102-3071174-whkb7j/index.html  
10 Herein referred to as FKF. 
11 http://www.fkf.or.ke/history/. 
12 State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, ‘What is Corruption?’ 
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00645/00657/00659/01387/index.html?lang=en. 
13 Ochieng’ E, Ndunda E, ‘Football Kenya Federation hit with claims of corruption’ Standard Media (17 July 
2007). http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/sports/article/2000088593/football-kenya-federation-hit-by-claims-of-
corruption See also ‘Kenya FA under investigation by anti-corruption agency’ BBC (26 July 2013) 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/23464557  
14 ‘Kenya FA under investigation by anti-corruption agency’ BBC (26 July 2013) 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/23464557  
15 ‘The Transparency International Football Governance League Table’ Transparency International 2015. 
16 Mututota M ‘Kenya: Transparency International gives FKF Zero Points in Governance League’ Capital FM (24 
Nov 2015). http://allafrica.com/stories/201511250491.html. 
17 FIFA Statutes Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress July 
2012 General Provisions Section 68.2 state that. ‘Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless 
specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional 
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and with no influence from third parties.18 This rule has been put in place to prevent political 
and government interference in the sport. However, this rule has been criticised for protecting 
corrupt officials. In 2004, Kenya was banned by FIFA for interfering with football matters after 
the government sacked KFF officials for corrupt activities.19 As a result, the government had 
to reinstate the officials.20 This is an illustration of how FIFA’s rule of non-intervention is 
“assisting” corrupt football union leaders in performing their corrupt activities. With protection 
guaranteed from the mother body of world football, most football union leaders engage in 
corrupt activities and this leads to the detriment of the game, especially in African countries 
(such as Kenya).21 
This paper aims to illustrate how the FIFA non-interference rule has led to the aiding and 
abetting of corruption and how it contravenes Kenyan law when the issue has been taken to 
national courts. It also aims to provide possible solutions to the issue.  
1.2. Background to the Problem 
The FIFA rule of non-interference was established in order to prevent political interference.22 
Political interference may be viewed as when a government tries to take direct control over the 
governance of football.23 It was important for FIFA to make this rule in order to deal with 
issues of political interference, where the governments of different states (especially 
authoritarian regimes) took matters into their own hands and imposed sanctions on Football 
Associations as well as players and coaches.24 An example of such actions taken by a 
                                                          
measures is also prohibited.’ Also Section 13.1(g) states each association is to manage their affairs independently 
and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties. 
18 Farell C, ‘FIFA’s non-interference rule is holding back serious investigations’ HITC Sport 
http://hereisthecity.com/engb/2013/05/24/fifas-non-interference-rule-is-holding-back-serious investigatio/. 
19 ‘Kenya banned from FIFA competition’ All Africa (2 June 2004). 
20 Farell C, ‘FIFA’s non-interference rule is holding back serious investigations’. 
21 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football: Corruption and the (Under)Development of the Game in 
the Continent (2014). 
22 Farell C, ‘FIFA’s non-interference rule is holding back serious investigations’ 
23 Regenass T, ‘We have strong principles’ FIFA.com (19 Oct 2011) http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/news/y=2011/m=10/news=regenass-have-strong-principles-1528544.html  
24 The most common case of political interference is when a government perceives that the Executive Committee 
of the national association is not performing well enough and decides to take action. Often, because the national 
team is losing too many games, they decide that changes must be made and want to put someone else in charge. 
See Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
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government that necessitated the creation of this law was the detaining and torture of Iraqi 
players by Saddam Hussein’s son after the Iraq National Team performed poorly in an 
international competition.25  
FIFA’s Congress26 voted in favour of enacting the non-interference rule which provides that 
“Recourse to any court of law is prohibited unless specifically provided in the FIFA 
regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional matters is also 
prohibited”.27 Further, Section 13.1 (I) of the FIFA Statutes provide that members28 are obliged 
to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by 
third parties. Section 13.1 (I) read together with Section 68.2 of the FIFA Statutes form the rule 
of non-interference. It is these two Sections read together that provide FIFA with the mandate 
to control football worldwide without any interference from the national governments of 
members or any other third parties. This mandate is assigned to the national association, to 
manage, control, maintain and develop football as a game. The associations are obliged to do 
this independently, without interference from the government or any other parties.29 FIFA’s 
position on non-interference was further supported by a United Nations resolution that 
“supported” autonomy of sports.30 The autonomy of sport may be defined as “…the possibility 
for non-governmental sports organisations to: 
i. Establish, amend and interpret rules appropriate to their sport freely, without undue 
political or economic influence; 
ii. Choose their leaders democratically, without interference by states or third parties; 
iii. Obtain adequate funds from public or other sources, without disproportionate 
obligations; 
                                                          
25 Sherwell P, ‘Saddam’s son tortured defeated footballers’ The Telegraph (5th Nov 2000) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1373322/Saddams-son-tortured-defeated-
footballers.html  
26 Sec. 21 of the FIFA Statutes provides that Congress is FIFA’s supreme legislative body. Every FIFA member 
is represented in Congress and is entitled to one vote. FIFA has 211 members. 
27 Sec. 68.2 of the FIFA Statutes. 
28 Sec 10.1 of the FIFA Statutes provide that any Association which is responsible for organising and supervising 
football in all of its forms in a country may become a member of FIFA. 
29 Regenass T, ‘We have strong principles’. 




iv. Use these funds to achieve objectives and carry on activities chosen without severe 
external constraints; 
v. Draw up, in consultation with the public authorities, legitimate standards proportionate 
to the fulfilment of these objectives.”31 
While this rule was enacted for prima facie good purposes, it has provided protection for 
corrupt officials, especially in Africa.32 Whenever an African country attempts to address 
corruption or any other transgression by their soccer associations, it is suspended by FIFA.33 
In June 2004, Kenya was banned from partaking in any international football activities because 
its government was accused interfering in the affairs of its football association, Kenya Football 
Federation (KFF) as it was known then.34 The Kenyan Government refused to reinstate the 
Kenya Football Federation35 which had been dissolved in March that year. Government 
officials had dissolved KFF over claims of corruption and replaced it with an interim 
Stakeholders Transition Committee, ahead of new elections which were then yet to be held.36 
The High Court of Kenya had dissolved KFF for various corruption and maladministration 
cases including failure to produce annual audited accounts for four years and allegations of 
misappropriation of funds.37 FIFA took this as interference subsequently issuing Kenya with a 
ban.38 As a result of the ban, Kenyan national football teams and clubs were no longer allowed 
to participate in friendly or competitive matches on the international stage.39 Consequently, the 
Kenyan Government had to ignore its own High Court and reinstate KFF and its officials 
                                                          
31 Chappelet JL, Autonomy of Sport in Europe, April 2010, France. 
32 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
33 Khumalo T, ‘Football’s rotten core must be excised’ News24 (7th April 2013) 
http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Footballs-rotten-core-must-be-excised-20150429  
34 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
35 Herein referred to as KFF. 
36 CNN, ‘Kenya kicked into exile by FIFA’ CNN International (2nd June 2004) 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/football/06/02/fifa.kenya/  
37 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
38 This decision was communicated to KFF President Maina Kariuki by FIFA General Secretary Dr Urs Linsi in 
a letter on 2 June 2004. See ‘FIFA bans Kenya’ BBC (2nd June 2004) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/africa/3769627.stm  




despite the corruption allegations levelled against them.40 This brought about a wide range of 
debates concerning sovereignty of states and FIFA’s sovereignty.  
The question regarding whether FIFA’s laws can trump national laws is pressing. FIFA and 
other sports federations are governed by neither national laws nor international laws. They have 
their own rulebooks and constitutions to govern them as private entities.41 This brings about 
another issue altogether, that is, whether the provisions of these rulebooks and constitutions 
(the FIFA Statutes in particular) can trump national law or international law.  This paper will 
attempt to establish whether the provisions of non-interference have brought about a conflict 
between laws and if so, recommend solutions. 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
The thinking behind FIFA’s rule of non-interference (and the autonomy of sports as a whole) 
is undoubtedly with good intention, that is, for the betterment and development of the game 
around the globe. However, this rule has blanketed corrupt football officials such that they 
become untouchable and cannot be summoned by the courts of their own states to answer for 
their malpractices. This has brought about a contravention of national law by the rule of non-
interference. While FIFA and sports federations should have autonomy, there should be limits 
to the power possessed by these sporting institutions. 
1.4. Theoretical Framework 
1.4.1. Global Legal Pluralism Theory42 
This theory stems from “lex mercatoria,43 the transnational law of economic transactions, is 
the most successful example of global law without a state”.44 It would therefore be appropriate 
                                                          
40 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football’. 
41 Akech M, ‘The Maurice Odumbe Investigation and Judicial Review of the power of International Sports 
Organisations’ Independent Researcher, Nairobi. 
42 Griffiths J, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’  No. 24 1986. States “Legal Pluralism refers to the normative heteroginity 
attendant upon the fact that social action takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping fields” 
43 the body of law that regulated the economic relations between foreigners and Roman citizens. See Goldman, 
B., Forum Internationale, Volume 3, 1983, 3. 
44 For example, non-governmental organizations often take part in international decision-making processes 
centred on the development and codification of international law, especially in the areas of human rights law and 
environmental law. This participation may involve contributing to the development of new international 
conventions, acting as official state delegations in treaty negotiations, and acting as a consultant for 
intergovernmental organizations. See Goldman, B., Forum Internationale, volume 3, 1983, 3. 
7 
 
to state that this example of transnational legal agreement be used in global sports law.45 The 
prime principle that underlies the global legal pluralism theory is the self-validating and self-
contained nature of global laws and agreements that are passed and entered without the 
influence, and not to be influenced by national governments. A theory of global pluralism will 
be relevant in analysing the existence, validity and autonomy of other emerging private legal 
orders, such as global sports law.46 
1.4.2. Liberal Theory47 
The liberal theory does not adequately acknowledge imbalances of power that are present in 
the private domain and predominantly presumes that parties are equal and are able to resolve 
any occurrences of abuses of private power among themselves, without the need for 
governmental intervention.48 The same theory applies in FIFA where imbalances of power are 
not recognised. As a result, private entities or persons working for private entities that abuse 
their power cannot be held accountable because it is assumed that such abuses can be dealt 
with privately (without state intervention) which is not the case. This is illustrated by the 2015 
FIFA corruption scandal (which will be discussed in more detail) where states such as the 
United States of America had to intervene in order to deal with abuse of office by FIFA 
officials. 
1.5. Literature Review 
James Tsabora states that FIFA has been steadfast on its laws of non-intervention.49 Countries 
have faced bans and others have actually been banned for politically interfering in the game. 
Although this FIFA rule was enacted for good purposes, it has inadvertently, aided and abetted 
corruption.50 The Nigerian case of 2010 is a good example. The Nigerian government through 
the Nigerian Sports Commission forced the Nigeria Football Federation’s Secretary General 
Musa Amadu and other members to stand down amidst corruption allegations. This did not go 
                                                          
45 Macuzzo M.F, ‘Lex Sportiva: Sports Law as a Transnational Autonomous Legal Order’ Published Thesis. 
46 Macuzzo M.F, ‘Lex Sportiva: Sports Law as a Transnational Autonomous Legal Order’. 
47 The liberal theory is a school of thought which can be thought to revolve around three interrelated principles: 
1. Rejection of power politics; 2. Accentuates mutual benefits and cooperation; 3. Implements nongovernmental 
actors for shaping state preferences and policy choices. 
48 Akech M, ‘The Maurice Odumbe Investigation and Judicial Review of the power of International Sports 
Organisations’ Independent Researcher, Nairobi. 
49 Tsabora J, ‘Cleansing the game: Mapping and Tackling State Induced African Trends in Football’. 
50 Tsabora J, ‘Cleansing the game: Mapping and Tackling State Induced African Trends in Football’. 
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well with FIFA and FIFA insisted that the government had to reinstate the Nigerian Football 
Federation officials. This meant that the government had no option but to reinstate the officials 
who were implicated in multi-million dollar corrupt practises. Consequently, these officials 
were free to continue at the helm of African football administration. 
Manase Kudzai Chiweshe states that FIFA’s standing statutes of non-interference have often 
meant corrupt leaders continuing in their positions for decades. 51  He goes on to state that the 
major obstacle facing African states in the fight against corruption is the FIFA rule of non-
interference. He states that the absence of a mechanism to find football administrators 
accountable for their corrupt activities is what has led to the detriment of the game. He also 
states that this rule has been used to circumvent the democratic process as any state which, with 
good intention, tries to clean up its football structure faces a ban from FIFA. 
In a study prepared by Transparency International, it is stated that there is a lot of corruption 
in the election of sports officials, and in the elections that take place in FIFA itself. 52  Any 
government intervention in these elections would be very problematic. 
Meier Henk, in his article, states that the freedom and self-regulation allowed for football 
associations may lead to considerable monopoly over their command.53 A lack of 
accountability and control of such institutions may have devastating effects.54 An example of 
such was when the English Football Association failed to make stadium regulations. This 
negligence resulted in the collapse of a stadium which caused the death of hundreds of people.55 
Although this took place in the 20th Century, it was a result of the freedom and self-regulation 
on the part of football associations. This brings forth the argument that while the football 
associations should have autonomy to carry out their activities, there should be some control 
over them. While nowadays it is not deaths from the collapse of stadia, there is still wrong-
                                                          
51 Chiweshe MK, ‘The Problem with African Football: Corruption and the (Under)Development of the Game in 
the Continent (2014). 
52 Bures R, ‘Why Sport is not Immune to Corruption?’ Transparency International, Strasbourg, Czech Republic 
2008. 
53 Meier H, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Sport’ Paper presented at 3rd ECPR Conference in  Budapest (8-
10 September 2005). 
54 Meier H, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Sport’. 
55 Martin J, ‘1 ‘Heads in the Sand’: Football, Politics and Crowd Disasters in Twentieth‐Century Britain 1’ Soccer 
& Society 5, number 2, (2004), 134-151. 
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doing emanating from autonomy that FIFA enjoys through the rule of non-interference. An 
example of such is corruption. 
Marios Papaloukas, in his article, states that global sports law and international sports law is 
different and should be severed from national law and should not be applied or interfered with 
in local courts. 56 However, he goes on to state that some national laws have provisions 
regarding these sports and some have money allocated for these sports in their national 
budgets.57 This implies, to some extent, some control over sports bodies by national 
governments.58 
Lin Chien-Yu provides in his article that sport plays an important role in state politics including 
education and uniting the people of the country.59 For some states, sports is the national 
identity. In his article, he states that it is important to not reduce sport to a tool of political-
economic elites, but it is also as important to ensure that the government associated with its 
sport should enhance the sport in question. For a state to enhance any given sport, it must fight 
vices such as corruption which only lead to the detriment of the game. The FIFA rule of non-
interferences incapacitates the state and as a result, the state cannot fight against corruption. 
In his thesis, Macuzzo, states that as a result of the globalization of sport, legal regulation of 
the international sport system has shifted almost completely outside the jurisdiction of national 
legal systems and into the private sphere of international and national sport bodies and sport-
specific arbitral tribunals.60 This has allowed the international sport system to develop into a 
self-contained and self-reproducing system of private transnational law.  With this autonomy 
have come fears that the international sport system is not subject to adequate legal regulation.61 
                                                          
56 Papaloukas M, ‘Policy, European Sports Law and Lex Sportiva’ Paper presented at 14th World I.S.A.L 
Congress, Athens, Greece, (November 2008) 
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/Papaloukas%20European%20Sports%20Law%20and%20Lex%2
0Sportiva.pdf  
57 Papaloukas M, ‘Policy, European Sports Law and Lex Sportiva’. 
58 Papaloukas M, ‘Policy, European Sports Law and Lex Sportiva’. 
59 Chien-Yu L, ‘Theorizing the Role of the State in Sport Politics’ International Journal of Sport and Exercise 
Science 1(1), 28 Dec 2008, 23-32. 
60 Macuzzo M.F, ‘Lex Sportiva: Sports Law as a Transnational Autonomous Legal Order’ Published Thesis. 
61 Macuzzo M.F, ‘Lex Sportiva: Sports Law as a Transnational Autonomous Legal Order’. 
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Borja Garcia and Henk-Erik Meier state in their article that FIFA has been blackmailing 
national governments with the non-interference rule.62 If a national government is sanctioned 
by FIFA, it is footballers and coaches who suffer the most because they are denied the 
opportunity to play in international matches and competitions. Additionally, since football is 
very popular globally, a ban from participating international football would annoy supporters 
who also happen to be the electorate of democratic states. A ban would therefore make 
electorate of these countries turn against its own government. Even where governments sought 
to fight corruption, these sanctions imposed by FIFA only backlashed on the government as 
their electorate demanded their teams to perform in international competitions. 
Migai Akech, in his article, using the case of Maurice Odumbe as an illustration, argues that 
national courts should regulate the powers of sport bodies where these powers have been used 
unreasonably.63 In the case of Maurice Odumbe, Odumbe had been banned from playing 
cricket for 5 years by the International Cricket Council (ICC) and the Kenya Cricket 
Association (KCA). Odumbe filed a petition seeking judicial review but the High Court of 
Kenya declined to entertain Odumbe’s petition on the grounds that the ICC and the KCA were 
not public bodies thereby not subject to judicial review. Migai argues in this article that this is 
against the emerging common law trend that even private bodies are subject to regulation. He 
also argues that because of globalisation and privatisation, private entities have now received 
immense power. These entities now considerably influence the liberties and livelihoods of 
individuals. In the majority of such cases, these processes have resulted in the delegation of 
what may be termed “public functions” to private entities. Public functions refer to the core 
functions that are considered to be the primary responsibility of the State. And in other cases, 
while private entities may not necessarily be exercising public functions, they nevertheless 
wield immense powers that equally impact upon the liberties and livelihoods of individuals.64 
He therefore argues that in both scenarios, state regulation is required. 
In an article by Mathew Mitten, he states that there is no consensus as to whether the rapidly 
developing body of laws that governs sports is a separate body of law or merely an application 
                                                          
62 Garcia B, Meier H, ‘Keeping private governance private: Is FIFA blackmailing national governments?’ Paper 
presented at 8th Sport & EU annual conference, Istanbul, Turkey 28 June. 
63 Akech M, ‘The Maurice Odumbe Investigation and Judicial Review of the power of International Sports 
Organisations’ Independent Researcher, Nairobi. 




of general law.65 He also states that in situations where there is conflict between global sports 
law and national law, parties may seek the court’s intervention. Some courts have accepted 
such applications and determined cases while others have refused to apply national law. In the 
case of Barnard v Australian Soccer Federation,66 the court recognised primacy of Australian 
National Law and rejected ASF’s argument that it had to comply with FIFA. In his article, he 
also illustrates conflict of international law with global sports law as was played out in the case 
of ABSL v Bosman.67 In this case, the European Court of Justice ruled that some of FIFA’s and 
UEFA’s68 rules contravened the EU Treaty.  
In an article by Dimitrios Panagiotopoulus, he states that the current goings-on in international 
sports (and uses FIFA as an example) is the validation of arbitrary and non-national power of 
sports federations.69 This power guarantees international prestige to these federations and 
autonomy for national federations with the aim of limiting the role of central government and 
the role of international society, which is organized around the nation-state. Consequently, a 
non-national sports legal order has been established for sporting life, which constitutes a barrier 
to establishing a sense of justice in sporting event.70 
In an article by Timothy Davies, he recognises that while some traditional legal scholars have 
argued that sports law is not a field of law of its own, and others argue that sports law is on its 
way to becoming a field of its own, many legal scholars now see sports law as a field of its 
own.71 Since sports law is neither national law nor international law, its superiority over 
national law is questionable. FIFA can enforce its laws over national countries because it is 
very powerful, however, this is not legal. FIFA’s rule of non-interference which ousts the 
jurisdiction of Kenyan courts contravenes Kenyan law which provides that the High Court of 
Kenya has unlimited and original jurisdiction on all criminal and civil matters.72 
                                                          
65 Mitten M, Opie H, ‘”Sports Law”: Implications for the development of international, comparative, and national 
law and global dispute resolution’ Tulane Law Review vol. 14. 2010. 
66 (1988) 81 ALR 51. 
67 [1995] ECR 1-4921. 
68 European Union of Football Associations. 
69 Panagiotopoulos D, ‘International sports rules’ implementation – decisions executability: The Bliamou Case’ 
Marquette Sports Law Review, Volume 15, Issue 1, (2001). 
70 Panagiotopoulos D, ‘International sports rules’ implementation – decisions executability: The Bliamou Case’ 
71 Davies T, ‘What is Sports Law?’ Marquette Sports Law Review Volume 11, Issue 2, (2001). 
72 Article 165 (3) Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
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In an article by Lorenzo Casini, he argues that decisions taken by sports federations have effects 
on public interest and individual rights and will therefore require regulation. He also argues 
that the legal and economic effects made by such institutions are vast and this calls for 
regulation.73 In his work, he also argues that global sports law does not fall under national or 
international law, rather, it is in its own sphere. 
1.6. Objectives 
1. To show the disconnect between national law and football law arising from the 
enactment of the non-interference rule. 
2. To illustrate how FIFA’s rule on non-interference has brought about the corruption in 
football. 
3. To propose recommendations to the issue. 
1.7. Assumptions and Hypothesis 
- The FIFA rule on non-interference has brought about a conflict between football law 
and national law. 
- The FIFA rule on non-intervention has brought about rampant corruption in football 
probably as a result of the conflict between the laws. 
1.8. Methodology 
The research methodology that will be used in this research will include a review of written 
material concerning this subject.  
                                                          
73 Casini L, ‘Sports Law: A Global Legal Order?’ 
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History of FIFA and the development of football law. An illustration of 
how the conflict between national law and football law began and how it 
has paved the way for corrupt activities. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The study of transnational private governance has increased a great deal in the last twenty 
years.74 Football law is governed through transnational private governance. Transnational 
private governance stems from transnational private authority which may be defined as “the 
ability of non-state actors to cooperate across borders in order to establish rules and standards 
of behaviour accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in the rule definition”.75 
This chapter aims to explain how FIFA, one of the oldest intergovernmental institutions, 
operates as a private entity with autonomy from national law.76 In doing so, it attempts to 
explain the ability of FIFA to challenge the authority of sovereign (sometimes even 
democratically elected) states. One of the research methods to be used in explaining the 
arguments in this chapter will be a case study which will illustrate how FIFA has the ability to 
safeguard its autonomy vis-a-vis sovereign states even in cases of corruption or wrongdoing. 
2.2. History of FIFA 
FIFA was formed in 1904 by the associations of France, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.77 Other football associations subsequently joined FIFA to 
make what it is comprised of today.78 The associations that first came together to form FIFA 
                                                          
74 Peters BG, Pierre J, ‘Governance without Government? Rethinking Public Administration’ Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Volume 8, Number 2, (April 1998). 
75 Graz J, Nolke, ‘Limits to the Legitimacy of Transnational Private Governance’ Paper prepared for the 
CSGR/GARNET Conference “Pathways to Legitimacy? The Future of Global and Regional Governance”, 
University of Warwick, (17-19 September 2007). 
76 Chappelet JL, Autonomy of Sport in Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, April 2010, Strasbourg, France. 
77 History of FIFA – Foundation, FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/history/  
78 Associations, FIFA, FIFA has 211 members. http://www.fifa.com/associations/  
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did so because they wanted to set out the laws that would be used to officiate football matches. 
As a result, they adopted the Laws of the Game.79 They also wanted to stage an international 
competition and the best way of doing so was by having one entity prepare and set up the 
competition.80 
2.3. Governance of FIFA 
FIFA is governed through transnational private governance.81 As has been stated, transnational 
private governance entails the ability of non-state actors to establish rules and standards of 
behaviour.82 Non-sporting examples of transnational private governance include the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Members (ICANN).83 IASB is right at the centre of international and 
global accounting and it establishes the credit-worthiness of states and corporations.84 It also 
provides transnational commercial arbitration.85 ICANN is a telecommunication entity that 
technically regulates the internet. It is not made up of states but of internet stakeholders.86 
FIFA, like other bodies governed through transnational private governance, establishes its own 
rules and standards of behaviour by enacting statutes that are binding on all members. Failure 
to adhere to these rules or standards of behaviour result in sanctions which are passed by FIFA. 
An example of a rule that has been passed by FIFA is the non-interference rule. The non-
interference rule basically states that members should perform their functions without 
interference from third parties.87 The non-interference rule also prohibits recourse to any 
                                                          
79 History of FIFA – Foundation, FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/history/ 
80 History of FIFA – Foundation, FIFA. http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/history/ 
81 Meier HE, Garcia B, ‘Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power 
over National Governments’ Public Administration 93, number 4, (2015), 890-906. 
82 Graz J, Nolke, ‘Limits to the Legitimacy of Transnational Private Governance’. 
83 Dingwerth K, ‘Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative Perspective’ 
International Studies Quarterly 52, number 3, (2008), 607-34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29734253.  
84 Dingwerth K, ‘Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative Perspective’ 
85 Dingwerth K, ‘Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative Perspective’ 
86 Lessig L, Code: And other laws of cyberspace, ReadHowYouWant.com, 2009. 
87 Section 13.1(g) Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress July 
2012 General Provisions states each association is to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own 
affairs are not influenced by any third parties. 
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courts.88 Any violation or attempted violation of this provision may result in sanctions. There 
have been several cases where states have attempted to fight corrupt activities being carried 
out by officials of football associations of their respective countries but these efforts have been 
frustrated because of the non-interference rule. Basically, any such attempt by a state will lead 
to a suspension from partaking in any international football matches.89 The cases of Poland, 
Greece and Spain, which will be discussed, clearly illustrate how FIFA has managed to strong-
arm governments of sovereign states by invoking the non-interference rule. This illustrates the 
amount of power that FIFA has. It has so much power that it may challenge a state even in 
cases of misconduct. This begs the questions; how did FIFA manage to get this regulatory 
power? Why do states comply? What are the effects of this power? 
2.4. How FIFA got regulatory power 
It is argued that FIFA’s regulatory power stems from historical institutionalism.90 Historical 
institutionalism underlines that institutions materialise from and are fixed in specific temporal 
processes and a bigger socioeconomic environment.91 These institutions then retain themselves 
by building up incentives. They also work on institutional stability and reproduction 
mechanisms.92 According to Fioretos,93 there are three fundamental basic mechanisms; 
                                                          
88 FIFA Statutes Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress July 
2012 General Provisions Section 68.2 state that. ‘Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless 
specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional 
measures is also prohibited.’ 
89 Section 13.3 states that a member may face sanctions if provisions of Section 13.1 are violated. Suspensions is 
one of the sanctions provided for under Section 14 of the FIFA Statutes Regulations Governing the Application 
of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress July 2012 General Provisions. 
90 Garcia B, Meier HE, ‘The power of FIFA over national governments: a new actor in world politics?’ Presented 
at: FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference, Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World, (23-25 July 
2014), University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
91 Thelen K, ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’ Annual Review of Political Science, (June 1999), 
369-404, 2. 
92 Pierson P, ‘The path to European integration: A historical institutionalist analysis.’ Comparative Political 
Studies 1996. See also Pierson P, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 2004. 
93 Fioretos O, ‘Historical institutionalism in international relations.’ International Organization, 2011. 
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(i) Positive feedback effects: In order to sustain current arrangements, institutions 
generate benefits which motivate actors to follow the rules. 
(ii) Increase returns: Occurs when positive externalities94 increase consistently as a 
result of institutional designs. 
(iii) Institutional complementarity: This occurs when the existence of one institution 
results in the increase in the returns of another, or, the efficiency of one institution 
complements another institution resulting in increase in its returns.95 
Historical institutionalism applies to FIFA.96 FIFA uses all of the mechanisms mentioned above 
in order to ensure perpetuity of regulation. Positive feedback effects are used to ensure that 
states adhere to the rules and regulations of FIFA as stipulated by the statutes. The mechanisms 
of increase returns and institutional complementarity are used by FIFA in the sense that it is 
nowadays a financial powerhouse with plenty of lucrative deals with transnational corporations 
such as Adidas. 
FIFA has a 5-prong approach to maintain its regulatory power: monopolization, politicization, 
popularization, commercialization and the “principle of reciprocity”. 
2.4.1. FIFA’s monopoly powers 
FIFA enjoys regulatory power because it has monopolised the sport.97 FIFA has monopolised 
the sport as 211 members have adhered to its requirements and laws in relation to football. It 
could be said that the members of FIFA act on behalf of their respective states in matters 
concerning football. As a result, no other institution can host a football tournament other than 
FIFA. FIFA managed to lure these states into becoming members because these members 
wanted to participate in world cups and international football competitions. Further, FIFA 
                                                          
94  A positive externality is a benefit that is enjoyed by a third-party as a result of an economic transaction. Third-
parties include any individual, organisation, property owner, or resource that is indirectly affected. Economics 
Online. http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Positive_externalities.html  
95 Hall P, Soskice D, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford 
University Press, England, 2001, 17. 
96 Meier HE, Garcia B, ‘Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power 
over National Governments’ Public Administration 93, number 4, (2015), 890-906. 
97 Meier HE, Garcia B, ‘Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power 




membership has been used by states to symbolise independence and sovereignty, for example, 
by Kosovo and Taiwan.98 This, to some extent, could be considered as an incentive for the 
members to join FIFA. It has thus brought about a monopoly. 
The rationale for having a monopoly has been a matter that has been debated widely 
throughout.99 However, it is necessary to have a monopoly in football because it ensures that 
football players, fans, teams et cetera can participate in competitions.  In the past, it was 
difficult to engage in football competitions because different teams played to different rules.100 
It was therefore important to have football played in adherence to a common set of rules in 
order to compete. An example of such a competition is the World Cup. The World Cup is 
considered to be one of the most prestigious tournaments in world sport. It is argued that a 
tournament as prestigious and important as the World Cup is best provided by a monopoly, 
such as FIFA, because a monopoly ensures that participation and rules of play are standard 
across the board. 101 
On the other hand, it is argued that a monopoly is not necessary in order to hold a prestigious 
tournament. For example, the sport of boxing sees several successful prestigious competitions 
being organised by competing organisations.102 There are different organisation that compete 
amongst themselves, that is, the World Boxing Organisation (WBO), World Boxing 
Association (WBA), and the International Boxing Federation (IBF). In tennis, the players 
became more involved in governance of the sport by taking away powers from the organisation 
and vesting them in their own player organisations, that is the Association of Tennis 
Professionals (ATP) and Women’s’ Tennis Association (WTA).103 In cycling, the sponsors and 
                                                          
98 Homburg H, ‘FIFA and the "Chinese Question", 1954-1980: an Exercise of Statutes’ Historical Social 
Research/Historische Sozialforschung, Volume 31, Number 1, (2006), 69-87. 
99 Szymanski S, ‘The Economic Design of Sporting Contests’ Journal of Economic Literature, 2003. 
100 ‘Cambridge… The Birthplace of Football?’ BBC (24th September 2014) 
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101 Scully GW, The Market Structure of Sports, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995. 
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organisers (not the institution, that is, Union Cycliste Internationale) of events are the most 
powerful.104 
While some experts argue that it is important to have a monopoly in order to host important, 
prestigious tournaments, the illustrations of tennis, cycling and boxing that have been given 
show that monopolies are not particularly necessary. 
2.4.2. Politicisation of the sport. 
Football has become a tool for politics. After the Second World War, politicisation of sport 
became paramount.105 For instance, the Soviet Union used the 1952 Olympics to spread its 
communist agenda and to show communist superiority.106 Participation in sports also suggests 
sovereignty. States participate in international sport events in order to illustrate sovereignty and 
independence. It could also be an illustration of nationalism. 
East Germany termed its athletes as “diplomats in suits”.107 This was a move to suggest to the 
world that East Germany was an independent state with its own sovereignty and 
independence.108 China also deemed any application by Taiwan to participate in international 
sport or any application to join any international sport federation as a form of infringement of 
the sovereignty of China.109 When Taiwan fielded its own national football team, it was 
considered to play a massive symbolic role during decolonisation.110 One of the first moves 
made by Kosovo after it announced its declaration of independence was the application of 
                                                          
104 Morrow S and Idle C, ‘Understanding change in professional road cycling’ Department of Sports Studies, 
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membership of FIFA and UEFA. It has also been argued that in the post-colonial era of the 
Arab world, an integral role of nation-state formation has been played by sport.111 In Bosnia, 
football has been used as a political platform and a form of political manipulation.112 
The Hillsborough Disaster113 was heavily politicised.114 It brought about plenty of police 
criticism (for example, after the Disaster, the police were termed as inhuman) and some form 
of police reform.115 It also resulted in plenty of criticism of Margaret Thatcher and her 
government for her dogmatic pursuit of free markets. In this context, football saw itself play a 
major role in the criticism of economics ideologies of the Conservative government of 
Margaret Thatcher.116 The Hillsborough disaster also brought about plenty of stadia reform in 
the United Kingdom.117 
Hosting of international competitions is also a political affair. Qatar intends to use the 2022 
FIFA World Cup in order to become an international political and business scene before and 
after the games.118 The 2014 Russia Olympics games were also used politically by the Russian 
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leadership to show the world (particularly the West) that Russia was an economic powerhouse 
with significant military strength.119 
The politicisation of football has made FIFA very powerful. Given that football is now being 
used as a political tool and FIFA possesses a monopoly in the football market, states must abide 
by FIFA’s rules in order to get their political and economic agenda across. 
2.4.3. Global popularity of football 
Football is the most popular sport in the world.120 FIFA has 211 members. This is more than 
the number of independent states in the world and more than the number of members in the 
United Nations.121 The popularity of football is also illustrated by the great number of viewers 
and followers of the FIFA World Cup.122 The 2014 FIFA World Cup was followed by over 3 
Billion people worldwide.123 
It is argued that football is popular because of its simple character and the little infrastructure 
it requires.124 It could also be argued that football is very popular since it originated from the 
United Kingdom and was very popular during the British dominion over the world.125 Its 
relationship with media outlets and new markets has also played a role in enhancing its 
popularity.126 
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2.4.4. Commercialisation of football 
Football, and modern sports in general, has become much commercialised.127 It is argued that 
the commercialisation of football began with Joao Havelange.128 Havelange served as the 
seventh president of FIFA from 1974 to 1998.129 He used the ideology of commercialising 
football as one of his campaign strategies to get elected as FIFA president.130 After getting 
elected as FIFA president, he embarked on commercialising football.131 This was done over a 
long period of time. The most significant way in which football was commercialised was by 
entering long-term contracts with transnational corporations such as McDonald’s, Coca Cola, 
Adidas et cetera.132 
FIFA made immense amounts of money from these contracts. In the past, FIFA would rely on 
contributions from its member associations. After commercialisation, FIFA did not require its 
members to contribute to it. Instead, FIFA started distributing funds to its member associations 
through distribution policies.133  
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2.4.5. The “principle of reciprocity”134  
Once FIFA became heavily commercialised, the principle of reciprocity became the norm in 
the governance of football.135 FIFA started using money for vote-buying.136 It is argued that 
FIFA officials strong-arm member associations by threatening to stop funding them. The funds 
given to the member associations are not much but are definitely significant to developing 
countries, such as Kenya.137 These funds are used as a means to ensure loyalty of developing 
countries to FIFA.138 
2.5. Effects of FIFA’s Power 
The effects of FIFA’s power become evident when a state attempts to make football regulations 
of its own. One of such effects is the suspension of states for interference. Whenever any form 
of regulation, whether legislative or judicial, is taken up by a state, FIFA deems this as 
interference and sanctions the state. One of the most effective means of sanctions used by FIFA 
is suspension or a threat of suspension. Suspensions seem to be effective because the amount 
of time between a suspension and a lift is very small. For example, Nigeria’s suspension only 
lasted four days.139 El Salvador’s, Belize’s and Cameroon’s suspensions lasted for less than a 
month.140 Further, only two suspensions have been confirmed, that is, those of Yemen and 
                                                          
134 The “principle of reciprocity” may be viewed as the exchange of favours, privileges or otherwise for mutual 
benefit. 
135 Darby P, ‘Africa, the FIFA Presidency, and the Governance of World Football: 1974, 1998, and 2002’, Africa 
Today Volume 50, Issue 1, (2003), 14. 
136 Tomlinson A, ‘Lord, Don't Stop the Carnival Trinidad and Tobago at the 2006 FIFA World Cup’ Journal of 
Sport & Social Issues, Volume 31 Issue 3, (2007), 259-282. 
137 Pielke R, ‘How can FIFA be held accountable?’ 
138 Eisenberg C, ‘Der Weltfußballverband FIFA im 20. Jahrhundert. Metamorphosen eines „Prinzipienreiters 
“(The World Football Association FIFA during the 20th century. Metamorphoses of a Strongly Principled 
Organisation)’. 
139 Nigeria’s suspension commenced on the 4th of October 2010 only to be lifted on the 8th of the same month. See 
Meier HE, Garcia B, ‘Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power over 
National Governments’ Public Administration 93, number 4, (2015), 890-906. 
140 Meier HE, Garcia B, ‘Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power 
over National Governments’. 
24 
 
Brunei Darussalam.141 Suspensions are effective because the electorate of states that elected 
the government also wants to watch its country participate in international competitions. 
Therefore, when a country is suspended from participating in international competitions by 
FIFA, the electorate protests. This subsequently makes the government adhere to FIFA’s 
demands in order to avoid being voted out. 
Associations are usually considered as the representatives of governments. These associations 
are supposed to represent states as their agents, however, FIFA challenges the states’ power as 
the principals of the agents (member associations).142 
In order to explain the effects of FIFA’s power, we examine three cases. The cases of Greece, 
Spain and Poland illustrate how FIFA exercises its power over sovereign states. 
2.5.1. The case of Greece 
Greece had been in a long tussle with FIFA. In 1979, the Greek government passed its first 
football regulations.143 The Hellenic Football Federation did not object to these laws because 
they provided public funding to the Federation.144 From the 1990’s onwards, there was a 
proliferation in match-fixing in the league and cup matches in Greece.145 In 1993, the 
government proposed legislation to change the method of referee nomination and to create a 
sports court.146 The Hellenic Football Federation rejected the proposed amendments. As the 
Greek government pushed to have the bill passed, the Hellenic Football Federation involved 
FIFA. FIFA took the Federation’s side and threatened to suspend Greece from international 
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football matches. It also threatened to exclude Greece from the 2002 World Cup. The 
government abandoned the proposed piece of legislation to avoid the repercussions.147 That 
was only the first dispute between FIFA and Greece. 
Another dispute between the Greek government and FIFA arose in 1999. In 1999, the Greek 
government attempted to make new laws with more oversight in football matters.148 The 
proposed legislation was to establish a disciplinary committee, new regulations for elections of 
the Hellenic Football Federation and executive state powers to dismiss the federations’ corrupt 
board members.149 The federation was against the bill and involved FIFA. FIFA threatened to 
suspend Greece from partaking in any international matches and threatened to exclude Greece 
from the 2002 World Cup. The government negotiated with the federation and FIFA. They 
subsequently agreed on regulations but these regulations left the structures of the federation 
and Greek football unaltered.150 This was not the last of disputes between FIFA and Greece. 
In 2004, another conflict between FIFA and Greece arose. The government of Greece 
attempted to make new football regulations that would see the incumbent Hellenic Football 
Federation chair lose his seat.151 The dispute carried on until 2006. The government’s persistent 
refusal to undo the legislation saw FIFA suspend Greece. Eight days after the suspension, the 
government got rid of the amendment and the suspension was lifted.152 
2.5.2. The case of Spain 
Spanish laws relating to football are very specific and intrusive. As a result, a conflict with 
FIFA was inevitable.153 The conflict particularly arose when the Spanish Sports Act154 saw the 
sports minister given extra powers to issue decrees and orders to the Royal Spanish Football 
Federation. The conflict specifically arose in 2008 when the federation failed to follow a 
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ministerial order to conduct elections.155 FIFA was involved in this matter and threatened to 
suspend Spain from partaking in any international football competitions. The Spanish 
government had to give in. As a result, the elections were held in accordance with the mode 
that the Royal Spanish Football Federation saw fit and the incumbent president, Angel Villar, 
was re-elected without any opposition.156 
2.5.3. The case of Poland 
One of the major problems that has faced Polish football is corruption. Over a hundred people 
have been charged with corruption in football including Polish Football Association 
dignitaries.157 As a result of widespread corruption allegations, the Polish government 
suspended the Polish Football Association board and replaced it with an interim management 
committee. FIFA and UEFA were involved in the matter and threatened to suspend Poland. 
UEFA also threatened that it would not consider Poland’s candidature for hosting the 2012 
European Championship.158 The government yielded to FIFA and reinstated the board. 
Match-fixing and corruption continued to be prevalent in Poland. Once Poland had secured its 
position as the hosts of the 2012 European Championship, the government attempted to 
intervene to deal with matters of match fixing and corruption.159 In doing so, the government 
created a supervisory post to watch over the Polish Football Association.160 FIFA and UEFA 
got involved again and refused to recognise the supervisor. They threatened the Polish 
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government and Poland risked losing hosting of the European Championship.161 The Polish 
government had to adhere to FIFA and UEFA and undo the regulation. 
2.6. Discussions 
The cases of Greece, Spain and Poland suggest that FIFA can challenge the sovereignty of a 
state. FIFA has become so powerful that it can make a state review its laws. Even in cases 
where states intervene and make regulations for the betterment of football, such as, by fighting 
corruption or other malpractices, FIFA takes the side of its member associate and threatens the 
state. States must comply because they risk suspension. 
2.7. Conclusion 
FIFA has been using the very effective means of suspension or threat of suspension to exert its 
power over states. This illustrates the immense power that FIFA possesses. It can even force 
states to change its policies and legislation. This power emanates from the fact that it controls 
access to football. For a state’s national team to perform in the international stage, it must 
comply with FIFA rules. Any suspension or threat of suspension may result in a public outcry 
which risks a government’s chances of getting re-elected. The power possessed by FIFA 
enables it to challenge the authority and sovereignty of states and has paved the way for corrupt 
activities because states cannot use their own machinery (including laws and judicial authority) 
to fight corruption in football. 
 
  
                                                          





The 2015 FIFA Corruption Scandal: A Case Study illustrating the Scale of 
Corruption in Football 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the amount and the magnitude of corruption in football. In doing so, it 
explains the various instances of corruption that have taken place in the football world 
generally and in FIFA particularly. This chapter will begin by discussing corruption as a 
general term and how it takes place in football and particularly in FIFA. Thereafter, it discusses 
the various instances of corruption within FIFA. The 2015 FIFA Corruption Scandal is a stark 
example. This chapter will attempt to discuss what transpired in May 2015 when FIFA’s 
executive members were arrested in a hotel in Zurich for allegedly committing fraud, money 
laundering and bribery. Other cases that will be discussed in this chapter include the 
Mohammed Bin Hammam case. 
3.2. What is Corruption? 
Corruption is a term that has not been clearly defined. This stems from the fact that scholars 
have failed to agree on a definition of the term. Any proposed definition of corruption does not 
meet all categories as required by scholars throughout the world. The definition that has been 
most generally been agreed upon is “the abuse of public power for personal gain”. For the 
crimes of theft, fraud and bribery to amount to corruption, there must be abuse of public 
office.162 In the previous chapter, it was established that FIFA is a transnational private 
organisation which performed public functions. As a result, members of FIFA are considered 
to hold an office for the benefit of the public and any such action that they perform may amount 
to corruption. 
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3.3. Why is corruption prevalent in FIFA? 
The latter parts of this chapter discuss corruption cases in detail and illustrate how FIFA has 
been permeated with corruption. This section attempts to discuss why FIFA has faced this 
problem.  
3.3.1. Lack of accountability 
One of the problems is lack of accountability. FIFA does not answer to any sovereign country 
or authority. While FIFA exists because it is constituted by associations (which are 
representatives of the different 211 countries in the world), FIFA is not answerable to any of 
these associations. No country can stand up to FIFA claiming that its executives are engaging 
in corrupt activities. Any such attempt would result in sanctions by FIFA for interference. An 
example of such a sanction would be a suspension of its national team or of some of its clubs.  
Another issue is that FIFA is incorporated in Switzerland under Swiss law.163 Switzerland has 
the power to hold FIFA to account for any of its actions premised on the fact that it has been 
incorporated in Switzerland.164 However, very little has been done in terms of accountability 
by Switzerland, particularly before May 2015.165 The only evident form of accountability was 
in May 2015 when FIFA officials were arrested in a hotel in Zurich and this was only after 
being pressured to do so by the United States of America’s Department of Justice.166 It could 
be argued that Switzerland failed to supervise FIFA and hold it to account because it feared 
being suspended for interference.167 
3.3.2. Lack of regulation and enforcement 
It could also be argued that FIFA is riddled with corruption because of lack of regulation and 
enforcement. Lack of adequate channels to regulate FIFA through national law may be one of 
the reasons FIFA is plagued with corruption. However, even where there are present avenues 
of regulation, lack of enforcement may be the reason. An example of such is Switzerland which 
has had the ability and capacity to regulate FIFA premised on the fact that FIFA is incorporated 
in Switzerland. FIFA must give its annual financial report to the government of Switzerland 
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and it is also subject to audit, however, this has not been done. FIFA’s financial records remain 
undisclosed.168 It could be argued that Switzerland has refrained from regulating FIFA because 
it fears being suspended from partaking in football activities. It could also be argued that 
Switzerland has refrained from regulating FIFA because of the benefits that arise from being 
the home of FIFA. Many sports organisations including FIFA, UEFA and the International 
Olympic Committee have chosen Switzerland as the host for their offices because they receive 
tax breaks and favourable legal terms which enable them to govern their own affairs 
autonomously.169 On the other hand, Switzerland benefits from hosting these offices because 
it is a source of prestige which enhances their reputation for neutrality and tolerance.170 
The capture theory as put out by Bordreux, Karahan and Coats explains this issue best.171 The 
capture theory basically states that a regulator will refrain from regulating an institution that it 
is supposed to regulate because it is not in its interest to do so.172 Switzerland will refrain from 
regulating FIFA because it is not in its interest to do so. Switzerland wants to continue being 
the home of FIFA and wants to continue to participate in football activities, things that may be 
risked by regulating FIFA. 
3.3.3. Free-riding 
It is argued that corruption is rampant in FIFA because every country waits for the next one to 
make a move. Basically, every country in the world knows that there are malpractices in FIFA 
because there have been widespread accusations of corruption in FIFA for a very long time.173 
However, no country has decided to act (at least not until the USA and Switzerland in 2015). 
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It could be argued that this is because every country had been waiting for another country to 
act.174 Countries were waiting for a joint coalition to be formed so that action could be taken.175 
This concept could also be explained in the sense that the current model of FIFA fitted the 
politicians and elite members of the public. Therefore, the people with the power to bring an 
end to these malpractices refrained from doing so because it served their interests best.176 
The three problems explained above boil down to one issue, that is, non-interference. There 
has been lack of accountability because the bodies (for example, the Swiss Government) tasked 
with holding FIFA accountable have refrained from doing so because they fear being 
suspended from partaking from football activities for interference. The same applies as regards 
lack of regulation and enforcement as well as free-riding. 
3.4. Corruption in FIFA 
Given that corruption has been defined and the factors that have enabled corruption to be so 
prevalent in FIFA have been discussed, this section now attempts to discuss the cases of 
corruption in FIFA. Corruption in football is rampant throughout the world. The previous 
chapter illustrated that corruption is ripe in Polish football. As a matter of fact, almost every 
football association in the world has been accused of corruption.177 It would therefore be 
unfeasible to explain every instance of corruption in football. That being the case, this section 
will attempt to discuss the stark examples of corruption in football. The 2015 FIFA corruption 
scandal is one. This scandal illustrated that FIFA is corrupt from the very top and as the 
allegorical Turkish proverb goes, “the fish starts rotting from the head down”, it is no surprise 
that member federations are also riddled with corruption.178 
3.5. The 2015 FIFA Corruption Scandal 
On May 27th 2015, fourteen top FIFA officials who were members of the FIFA executive 
committee were arrested on the belief that they engaged in tax evasion, bribery, fraud and 
money-laundering. It is alleged that they engaged in these activities in order to secure their own 
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interests regarding marketing and media rights as well as locations for the world cup.179 It is 
estimated that the total estimated value of the money that exchanged hands through corruption 
in this scandal was more than $150 million.180 Some journalists claim that this is only the tip 
of the iceberg.181 The arrests were made by Swiss Police on behalf of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation182 of the United States of America which had been investigating this issue for 
over three years.183 The United States Department of Justice wanted the Swiss to have the FIFA 
officials extradited and charged in the United States of America with the abovementioned 
crimes.184 The Swiss authorities also raided the respective FIFA banks as well as FIFA 
headquarters and gathered electronic data and documents.185 It is argued that the FBI 
investigation and the subsequent arrests were instigated by the awarding of hosting rights to 
Russia for the 2018 World Cup and Qatar for the 2022 World Cup.186 Soon after these arrests, 
the football world saw Sepp Blatter (the then FIFA president) and Michel Platini (the then 
UEFA president) investigated. They were subsequently banned from participating in any 
football matters for eight years.  
The events leading up to the 2015 corruption scandal are as follows. In December 2010, it was 
determined that the 2018 and 2022 World Cups were to be hosted in Russia and Qatar 
respectively.187 In February 2011, two FIFA executive committee members were banned in 
relation to the awarding of the world cups to Russia and Qatar.188 In March 2011, Mohammed 
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Bin Hammam declared his bid for presidency but he was banned for life later in June for his 
role in corrupt activities.189 In July 2012, Michael J Garcia was asked by FIFA to prepare a 
report on corruption in FIFA.190 He submitted his report between September and December 
2014 and that is when the pandemonium began.191 In May 2015, FIFA officials were arrested 
and investigations began. Blatter was elected for another four-year term.192 Investigations 
showed that the money that exchanged hands was in the tens of millions of US dollars. In July 
2015, Platini stated that he would run for FIFA presidency. However, in September 2015, 
investigations of Blatter began and they showed that he made a disloyal payment to Platini. As 
a result, Blatter and Platini were suspended as FIFA president and UEFA president for ninety 
days. Upon further investigation, allegations arose that the German Football Association was 
involved in securing the 2006 World Cup which was held in Germany. Even Blatter hinted that 
the World Cup was awarded to Germany because of bribery.193 More investigations were done 
on Blatter and Platini. In December 2015, Blatter and Platini were suspended from partaking 
in any football activity for eight years.194 Blatter and Platini appealed this decision by the FIFA 
Ethics Committee but their bans were only reduced to six years by the FIFA Appeals 
Chamber.195 Sepp Blatter appealed again at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) but the 
six year ban was upheld by the court.196 
                                                          
189 ‘The rise and fall of Mohamed Bin Hammam – timeline’ The Guardian (1 June 2014) 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jun/01/mohamed-bin-hammam-timeline  
190 Gibson O, ‘Michael Garcia quits FIFA ethics committee over handling of report’ The Guardian (17 December 
2015) https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/dec/17/michael-garcia-resigns-fifa-ethics-committee  
191 Gibson O, ‘Michael Garcia’s report into Russia and Qatar World Cups suffers new delay’ The Guardian  (17 
June 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/17/michael-garcia-report-russia-qatar-world-cups  
192  Gibson O, ‘Sepp Blatter elected as FIFA president for fifth term’ The Guardian (29 May 2015) 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/29/sepp-blatter-reelected-fifa-president-fifth-term  
193 ‘Germany Furious at World Cup Corruption Claims’ Spiegel Online (16 July 2012) 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-rejects-blatter-claims-that-2006-world-cup-was-bought-
a-844619.html  
194 ‘FIFA: Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini get eight-year bans’ BBC (21 December 2015) 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/35144652  
195 ‘Sepp Blatter, Michel Platini bans reduced to six years by FIFA’ ESPN FC (24 February 2016) 
http://www.espnfc.com/blog/fifa/243/post/2814374/fifa-cuts-sepp-blatter-and-michel-platini-bans-to-6-years  




All those arrested on May 27th 2015 had a connection to the United States of America or South 
America.197 It is for this reason that the FBI reached out to the Swiss officials to arrest them. 
The FBI investigations into FIFA’s officials was heavily boosted by Chuck Blazer. Blazer was 
once a member of FIFA’s executive committee.198 He became an FBI witness after being 
investigated by FIFA for tax evasion and corruption.199 The FBI commenced investigations on 
him as a result of his lavish lifestyle in New York where he owned two apartments in Trump 
Tower, one of which was rumoured to have been for his cat.200 Blazer became an FBI witness 
and gave the FBI information pertaining to corruption in FIFA, of which he participated.201 It 
is as a result of this that the FBI and the United States Department of Justice decided to go after 
the FIFA officials in Zurich. 
3.6. Legal basis for the action taken by the United States of America to arrest FIFA 
officials in 2015 
The United States of America invoked their national criminal law to effectuate the arrest of the 
FIFA officials. The United States Department of Justice argued that these officials violated the 
United States laws of money laundering, racketeering and wire fraud.202 It therefore contacted 
Swiss police to arrest the officials and asked Switzerland to extradite them to the United States 
of America in accordance with the US-Switzerland extradition agreement.203 
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The FBI investigated FIFA for corrupt activities for about three years before the arrests.204 On 
the 27th of May 2015 when the arrests were carried out, they were performed by Swiss police 
upon instruction by the FBI. The Swiss police had every legal right to perform the arrest given 
that the officials were in Switzerland. 
It could also be argued that the United States of America were in a position to commission the 
arrests because of the vast resources, size, wealth and extensive experience of the United States 
Department of Justice particularly in prosecuting complex white-collar crimes.205 Additionally, 
two of the fourteen indicted FIFA officials were United States of America citizens, one was a 
United States permanent resident and three owned residences in the United States of America. 
Furthermore, most of the officials were actively involved in CONCACAF206 which is the 
federation which governs North American football and is located in Miami, Florida.  
The United States of America invoked its own national law to commission the arrest of the 
FIFA officials. This action, albeit revolutionary in football law, it is not unprecedented in other 
circumstances. For instance, the United Kingdom has invoked the Bribery Act in other 
jurisdictions, so have the Canadians with the Secret Commissions Act.207 
3.7. The Mohamed Bin Hammam case 
In June 2011, Hammam208 announced that he would run for FIFA presidency.209 This would 
see him challenge the incumbent Sepp Blatter.210 In order to boost his chances in the race, he 
set up a meeting with the Caribbean Football Union.211 After his speech at the meeting, he left 
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the room and gave each national representative a “gift”. The gift was a brown envelope which 
contained $40,000 cash. This was a tactic to bribe the Caribbean federations to vote for him in 
the then upcoming presidential elections. The FIFA Ethics Committee began investigating 
Hammam and as a result, he withdrew his candidature.212 The FIFA Ethics Committee found 
Hammam guilty and banned him for life.213 Hammam appealed at the FIFA Appeals Chamber 
but he failed and his lifetime ban was still in force.214 He then appealed at the Court of 
Arbitration for Sports (CAS) where he won the appeal and the life-ban was reversed and the 
decision to ban him for life was quashed.215 Despite this initial success, FIFA brought a further 
action against Hammam for corruption which he lost at both FIFA and CAS level.216 
3.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to discuss corruption in FIFA. It has discussed corruption as a 
concept in football, the factors that have enabled corruption to prevail in FIFA (with the rule 
of non-interference being one of the main factors if not the main factor) and the various 
instances of corruption within FIFA as an entity and as the governing body of football. Given 
that FIFA is the governing body of football and controls football throughout the planet, if it is 
corrupt, corruption will trigger down to its member federations as well. This chapter has 
attempted to outline that corruption in FIFA is no longer a matter of accusations and defamation 
but it is ripe within football generally. 
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How the Kenyan Courts and the Kenya Sports Disputes Tribunal have 
dealt with corruption in football and the non-interference rule 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Very little has been determined by Kenyan courts concerning issues of corruption in football 
particularly in relation to the FIFA rule of non-interference. Kenyan courts have not really 
encountered an issue of corruption which it has had to (or refused to) deal with based on FIFA’s 
rule of non-interference. As a result, this chapter will attempt to discuss one of the issues that 
this thesis aims to explore, that is, how the FIFA rule of non-interference contravenes Kenyan 
law. 
This chapter aims to discuss the position taken by Kenyan courts when matters concerning non-
interference or corruption were brought before them. While the Sports Disputes Tribunal is a 
fairly new body thus has created little jurisprudence in all matters sport,217 the Kenyan courts 
have received quite a number of cases before it, particularly concerning non-interference. The 
cases illustrate that the non-interference rule has brought about a lot of questions concerning 
the jurisdiction of courts to hear matters concerning football. This chapter will attempt to 
discuss these cases, their facts and findings and try to analyse the findings of the courts vis-à-
vis the legality of FIFA law and FIFA’s power over national governments as discussed in 
previous chapters, particularly, chapter two. 
4.2. Kenyan Cases 
4.2.1. Salim Sumra & 2 others v Kipchoge Keino & 3 others. Civil Suit No. 266 of 
2004 
In this case, the plaintiff argued that FIFA had no powers to control football activities in Kenya. 
In his determination, the current Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya, David Maraga (he was 
then a judge of the High Court of Kenya) stated in his dictum that if it was indeed true that 
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FIFA had no powers to control football activities in Kenya, FIFA would not have banned the 
Kenyan national football team from participating in world cup qualifying matches. The judge 
premised his argument on a ban imposed by FIFA on Kenya from participating in world cup 
qualifiers in 2004.218 
The determination by the judge that FIFA had power to control football activities in Kenya was 
not established by interpreting a particular provision of any law. The learned judge did not 
invoke any statute to establish that FIFA had the power to control football activities in Kenya. 
He premised his argument on a political truth. The political truth being that despite there being 
no Kenyan statute or Kenyan law allowing FIFA to control football in Kenya, FIFA still 
possessed the power to determine how football affairs would be run in the independent 
republic. 
This political power stems from the arguments made in this dissertation particularly in the 
second chapter. The fact that FIFA monopolises football and is the only available avenue for 
states to compete on the global stage gives FIFA immense power to control football activities. 
The power is so great that FIFA can cite it and use it to trump national law. Sovereign states 
that are supposed to be independent cannot use their own state machinery and their own state 
laws to defeat malpractices, such as corruption, in football. Any such attempt would result in a 
ban. 
4.2.2. Alfred Wekesa Sambu & 4 others v Mohammed Hatimy & 12 others. Civil 
suit No. 1281 of 2006 
In this case, the plaintiffs were aggrieved by a decision of the National Executive Committee 
of the Kenya Football Federation (KFF) to remove them from office. They argued that they 
were removed from office illegally and that their removal was null and void. 
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs, being former employees of (KFF), ought to have 
sought remedies through proper channels as stipulated by the KFF constitution. They argued 
that the KFF constitution provided that, by virtue of Article 46 and 47 of the constitution, it 
was mandatory for such a dispute to be resolved through arbitration. The defendants further 
averred that the FIFA Statutes provided that recourse to ordinary courts is prohibited thus 
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praying that the court refer the matter to arbitration as required by the KFF constitution and the 
FIFA Statutes.219 
The case was presided over by Justice Visram. According to the learned judge, the parties 
submitted themselves via their agreement to be bound by the KFF constitution and the FIFA 
Statutes. Therefore, the means of dispute resolution would be determined by the means 
stipulated by the agreements that they were bound by. The court ruled that the case was to be 
referred to arbitration in accordance with the KFF constitution and FIFA Statutes. 
In this case, the court determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court found 
in favour of the defendants who argued that the FIFA statutes and the KFF constitution required 
the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the laws of FIFA and KFF. It could be 
argued that the court was reluctant to hear the matter because it feared that sanctions would be 
imposed on Kenya by FIFA for interference. This argument is pedestalled on the fact that the 
defendants argued that FIFA statutes prohibited recourse to ordinary courts and any such 
violation would bring about sanctions by FIFA. 
4.2.3. Wilberforce Kilibwa v Mumias Sugar Company Limited [2013] eKLR.220 
Wilberforce Kilibwa was a footballer who played for Mumias Sugar football team. While 
playing for the club, he got injured. As a result of heavy medical expenses to treat his injury, 
Wilberforce sought compensation from his former employers, albeit ten years later.  
It was held that Mumias Sugar Company was liable to pay Wilberforce. In making its 
determination, the learned judge invoked FIFA law which required every club to insure its 
players and cover for its players’ medical affairs.221 
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In this case, the court did not invoke any local law to make its determination. It made its 
determination based on FIFA law in spite of the fact that Kenya has its own employment and 
labour laws. This case therefore suggests that FIFA law can be applied in Kenyan courts. 
4.2.4. Football Kenya Federation v Kenya Premier League Limited & 4 others 
[2015] eKLR.222 
This case was a result of a lengthy tussle between Football Kenya Federation and Kenya 
Premier League limited et al. The two parties quarrelled over fixtures and dates of the premier 
league and moved to court to have it resolved. The defendants argued that the court had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter by invoking the FIFA statute which provides that recourse to 
ordinary courts is prohibited.223 The defendants further averred that the court ought to refer the 
matter to the proper channels as stipulated by FIFA statutes. 
This case brought about a huge debate over jurisdiction. Given that the FIFA statutes prohibited 
recourse to ordinary courts, and as has been argued in this paper that this particular provision 
of the FIFA statutes read together with section 13.1 of the same statute give rise to the FIFA 
rule of non-interference, this case becomes massively important to discuss.224 
The court carefully analysed the arguments presented before it and made its decision. The 
honourable judge presiding over the matter was Lady Justice Roselyn Ekirapa Aburili and it is 
important to follow the judge’s chain of thought in coming to her decision. 
The judge first cited the case of Owners of Motor Vessel Lillian “S” v Caltex Oil Kenya Ltd.225 
In this case, it was held that jurisdiction is the most important factor in determining a matter. 
Where a court establishes that it has no jurisdiction, it has no option but to down its tools. 
The judge went on to cite Patel v Dhanji & others.226 In Patel, Miller J stated that courts can 
entertain suits in matters of natural justice but must be slow in intervening in matters 
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concerning club affairs. Club affairs should be left in the hands of the members. The judge 
cited this case in order to show that courts can interfere if matters are of natural justice. Further, 
where the members or the parties can solve the matter out of court, the court should enable 
them to do so.  
The judge went on to cite the case of Kenya Medical Practitioners & Dentist Union v 
Transitional Authority v Council of Governers which was a case that heavily relied on the 
case of Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume.227 In this case, it was stated that where 
there is an obligation created by statute and a remedy is provided by that particular statute, the 
person seeking a remedy is deprived of any other means of enforcement except as provided for 
by the statute. This basically means that if the FIFA statutes and the FKF constitution provide 
for a particular remedy for a failure to perform an obligation, the person seeking a remedy has 
no option but to follow what the FIFA statutes and the FKF constitution provide. The FIFA 
statutes and FKF constitution provide for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution. 
From what has been established above, it is clear that FIFA statutes and the FKF constitution 
have ousted the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts. However, the learned judge went on. She cited 
the case of R V Public Procurement Administrative Review Board which stated that ouster 
clauses are effective as long as they are not unconstitutional, consistent with the main objective 
of the said Act and pass the test of reasonableness and proportionality. Therefore, according to 
Lady Justice Aburili, 
“…jurisdiction may be precluded or restricted by legislative mandate but if such an ouster 
clause leaves no room for remedy, it can be struck down for unreasonableness…” 
The judge went on in her analysis to cite the case of Safmarine Container NV of Antwerp v 
Kenya Ports Authority where it was held that jurisdiction can only be limited or conferred by 
the Constitution.228 This argument can be backed up by the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia 
v Kenya Commercial Bank & 2 others where the Supreme Court of Kenya established that 
jurisdiction flows from the constitution or from legislation or both.229 
From the above case law, it is clear that in order to oust jurisdiction, one must invoke a 
legislative ouster or a constitutional provision. According to the learned judge, the Sports Act 
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does not expressly oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. Further, the Sports Act and the Sports 
Tribunal were still in transition period and were still finding ground. She also alluded to the 
fact that sports organisations had not yet properly adhered to the Sports Act. 
The learned judge went on to give reasons as to why it would be absurd for the FIFA statutes 
and the FKF constitution to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kenya. First, the High 
Court of Kenya is given its jurisdiction by the Constitution of Kenya and Kenyan statutes and 
not by a body’s constitution. Second, according to Article 165(3) of the Constitution of Kenya, 
the High Court has unlimited and original jurisdiction on all criminal and civil matters. The 
constitution, however, provides an ouster. According to Article 165 (5), the High Court will 
not have jurisdiction in respect of matters reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Environmental and Land Court.230 
Third, the High Court has supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and any authority 
or body exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function but for a superior court.231 Fourth, 
Article 94 (5) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that no body other than Parliament has the 
power to make laws unless as provided for in the Constitution of legislation. The judge also 
stated that it was her humble view that subsidiary legislation cannot oust the jurisdiction of the 
High Court. In making this assertion, the judge cited the case of Alfred Obuya Otieno v 
Chairman National Nurses Association of Kenya & another.232 In this case, Asago J stated 
that societies’ constitutions cannot oust the jurisdiction of a court of law. This opinion may be 
backed up by the case of Peter Gichuki v Independet Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
where it was also held that a society’s constitution cannot oust the jurisdiction of a court.233 
Fifth, the honourable judge stated that it was not proved that FIFA statutes were ratified as 
treaties or conventions. What was presented to him by the parties did not illustrate any form of 
ratification of FIFA statutes. It is indeed a fact that FIFA statutes have not been ratified in 
Kenya. Therefore, it would be risible to refer to FIFA law as international law. The judge went 
on to give her sixth reason to refuse to acknowledge FIFA statutes and the FKF constitution as 
an ouster of High Court jurisdiction. The sixth reason was that if in the said case it was proven 
that FIFA law was indeed considered a treaty, it would still not be above the Constitution and 
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Kenyan statutory law. She premised her argument on the argument that treaties should be 
implemented in utmost good faith, that is, pacta sund servanda. 
The seventh and final reason she gave was that a determination ousting the court’s jurisdiction 
would be in violation of Article 48 of the Constitution which provides that every person has a 
right to access justice.234 She premised this assertion on the fact that while courts should 
encourage out-of-court dispute settlement, when this matter was taken to FIFA they did not 
help much in resolving the dispute. For the seven reasons given and the arguments presented 
above, the court ruled that it had the jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
4.3. Discussion 
The cases discussed in this chapter have shown that there is indeed a conflict between FIFA 
laws and Kenyan national law. The conflict may be summed up as follows. The Constitution 
of Kenya provides, under Article 165, that the High Court has unlimited jurisdiction on all civil 
and criminal matters.235 Further the Constitution states that it is the supreme law of the land 
and that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of 
inconsistency.236 The FIFA rule of non-interference ousts the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts 
(including the High Court of Kenya) by stating that recourse to ordinary courts of law is 
prohibited. From the case law discussed in this chapter, it has been established (particularly 
from the findings and analysis of Lady Justice Aburili in Football Kenya Federation) that the 
FIFA rule of non-interference cannot oust the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts, particularly, that 
of the High Court because it has been granted by the Constitution as unlimited and original. 
The FIFA rule of non-interference, therefore, contravenes Kenyan law. 
The conflict is further fuelled from the fact that FIFA possesses immense power to implement 
its own laws. If a court of law makes a ruling against a certain football association, FIFA can 
simply ban that country from participating in football activities. As has been discussed 
severally in this paper, every country must adhere to the FIFA rule of non-interference in order 
to avoid being banned. It is therefore clear that FIFA is strong-arming states into following its 
rules in spite of the fact its rules cannot legally trump national law. 
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The question of whether international law trumps national law is not relevant in this context. 
This assertion is made premised on the fact that FIFA law is not international law. Kenya has 
not ratified any treaty in relation to the FIFA statutes.237 
4.4. Conclusion 
Kenyan courts have faced the issue of non-interference before them. In all the cases, it has been 
an issue of contention. Some judges have ruled in favour of the FIFA rule of non-interference 
and others have questioned its legality to oust the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts. That said, from 
the jurisprudence established in the cases discussed above, it is clear that the FIFA rule of non-
interference contravenes Kenyan law. 
 
  
                                                          





Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to sum up the discussions in the previous chapters. In doing so, it shall 
conclude on whether the FIFA rule of non-interference has brought about corruption and 
whether it has contravened Kenyan national law. It shall also propose recommendations that 
may assist in curbing this conundrum. 
5.2. Findings 
In an attempt to fight corruption in football in Kenya, one of the hurdles that the state may face 
is the FIFA rule of non-interference. As a result of the provisions of the FIFA rule of non-
interference, the Kenyan Republic cannot use its own state machinery to defeat the evil 
malpractice.238 Any sort of attempt to do so will result in a ban by FIFA. A state cannot risk 
being banned by FIFA because it may turn the electorate against the ruling government.239 The 
electorate would want to see its national team play international competitions and any move by 
the government that would jeopardise that would risk it being voted out in the next general 
election.240 
The FIFA rule of non-interference has brought about corruption. The cases that have been 
discussed illustrate that the non-interference rule has brought about corruption by blanketing 
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football officials. An example of these cases is that of Poland.241 As discussed in chapter 2, 
Polish football is marred with corruption.242 When the government of Poland attempted to take 
action, the Polish National Football Team was banned from participating in international 
football qualifiers. Poland also risked losing the hosting of the 2012 UEFA Euro 
Championship.243 The FIFA rule of non-interference has also protected individual persons 
working in FIFA itself, for example, the FIFA Executive Committee members. This was 
evidenced in the third chapter of this paper. For a long time, FIFA officials had been accused 
of being corrupt, however, no action was taken until 2015.244 One of the main reasons as to 
why no action was taken against the FIFA officials prior to 2015 was because of the FIFA rule 
of non-interference. States were basically avoiding to take action because any action would be 
deemed to interference.245 Further, no state wanted to be in FIFA’s bad books because there 
was plenty at stake. For instance, states would receive less money from FIFA through the 
principle of reciprocity. FIFA, now a very rich and commercialised entity, with plenty of funds 
at its disposal, gives countries various amounts of funds based on the loyalty they show to the 
persons who pull the strings in FIFA.246 
The FIFA rule of non-interference contravenes Kenyan national law. This assertion is based on 
the analysis of various Kenyan constitutional provisions, statutory pieces of legislation and 
case law. The FIFA rule of non-interference ousts the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts (including 
the High Court) in matters concerning football.247 According to the Constitution, the High 
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Court has unlimited and original jurisdiction on all criminal and civil matters. According to 
case law, for a certain provision to oust the jurisdiction of a court, it must be constitutional or 
statutory.248 The FIFA rule of non-interference is neither statutory nor constitutional.249 It is 
not even international law because FIFA statutes have not been ratified as treaties or 
conventions.250 From this analysis, the High Court has the capacity and the jurisdiction to hear 
matters concerning football. This is premised on the argument that the High Court has been 
granted unlimited jurisdiction to hear any civil or criminal matter by the supreme law of the 
land.251 Corruption in football definitely falls within this criteria. 
Despite it being illegal for FIFA’s rule of non-interference to oust the jurisdiction of the High 
Court, it may do so successfully. This is because FIFA enjoys immense power which stems 
from monopolising the sport and strong financial muscle. It could manipulate sports into 
following its orders by using money or it could strong-arm states into following their rules by 
threatening to ban or by banning them from performing at the international level. This brings 
about an issue of FIFA having the autonomy to have its own rules which it can impose on 
sovereign states at the expense of their national laws. 
5.3. Recommendations 
The importance of having sports autonomy is unquestionable. Excessive political interference 
has stressed the importance of autonomy of sports tremendously. Instances of torture of football 
players by an authoritarian regime and the detainment of athletes who perform poorly have 
illustrated the need for sports affairs to be governed independently and with autonomy.252 
However, this autonomy has been abused. An example of such an abuse is when football 
officials are blanketed by the FIFA rule of non-interference. While autonomy should be 
protecting footballers, fans and all football stakeholders from adverse actions particularly by 
authoritarian regimes, it has also protected corrupt football officials. Such occurrences have 
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been copious and a few examples include, Kenya, Nigeria, Poland and the 2015 FIFA 
corruption scandal.253 One of the ways of dealing with this issue is by having negotiated 
autonomy. 
5.3.1. Negotiated Autonomy 
Negotiated autonomy was a phrase coined by Jean-Loup Chappelet.254 In his book, Chappelet 
discusses examples of successful negotiated autonomy systems in sport.255 A system of 
negotiated autonomy basically ensures orderly structural and balanced relations between public 
authorities and sports federations at the national level.256 
Successful systems of negotiated autonomy in sport are mainly European. An example of such 
is the Council of Europe’s formation of the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS).257 
EPAS was formed in order to assist sports associations and public authorities to have 
discussions on sports matters in order to ensure fairer, healthier and better sports governance.258 
The Council of Europe has also formed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE). PACE basically appeals for extensive co-operation between public authorities and 
sports federations. The United Kingdom has followed suit and formed its own All-Party 
Parliamentary Football Group whose main focus is to prepare policy on football matters 
particularly in relation to good governance.259 
The European Union has also attempted to create systems of negotiated autonomy. The 
European Union created the European Sports Forum which had its first meeting in Brussels in 
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1991.260 Sports federations, sports ministries, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, 
the International Olympic Committee et cetera have been involved in the forum. While this 
forum is mainly advisory, it has contributed a great deal to understanding and dialogue among 
stakeholders in sports.261 Its recommendations have also been taken up by the European 
Commission which prepares sport policy.262 
The European Union has also created the Social Dialogue in Sports Centre. It was created by 
the 2007 European Union White Paper on Sport. It was introduced for football and it mainly 
advocated for social dialogue between public authorities and sports federations. It has been 
very successful as it has resulted in the drafting of a common code of conduct and its successes 
have been echoed by other sports as they want a similar system for dialogue.263 Chappelet also 
cites the meeting and negotiations between the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Council of 
Europe as successful negotiated autonomy. He states that the Council of Europe was unhappy 
with certain rules in the World Anti-Doping Code on the “whereabouts rule” in relation to 
human rights.264 The two parties set up a meeting whose recommendations were approved 
unanimously by the World Anti-Doping Agency Committee.265 
Chappelet also gives the examples of individual countries such as France and Germany.266 In 
France, the state is the sole power in matters related to sport. It exercises this power through 
sports federations which must sign agreements with the government in order to agree on and 
set the limits of power of both parties.267 Every year, public officials representing the 
government and the sports federations meet to discuss ways of improving sports in the country. 
During this meeting, the federations also report to the state on any progress relating to sport.268 
While the government recognises the autonomy of its federations, it ensures that the federations 
do not get out of hand by ensuring that these laws and requirements are adhered to. In Germany, 
the body in charge of all sports in the country is known as German Olympic Sport 
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Confederation (DOSB).269 It is autonomous. It has, however, signed contracts with the 
government setting out the rights, powers and obligations of both the government and the 
DOSB. Both France and Germany fund their sports federations. It could be argued that this is 
a tool of luring them to sign the contracts.270 
These examples of negotiated autonomy illustrate that a state can discuss with its respective 
sports federations on sports matters. The Kenyan government can negotiate with the FKF and 
set out obligations, rights and powers of each party in a manner that will ensure accountability 
and transparency in football. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This dissertation has attempted to illustrate that the FIFA rule of non-interference has 
contributed to corruption. It has also illustrated that the FIFA rule of non-interference 
contravenes Kenyan law. By doing so, it has demonstrated the ability of FIFA to enforce its 
rules by virtue of it being a very powerful entity. This dissertation has also attempted to 
recommend solutions to the problem, that is, the Kenyan government should work towards 
having a system of negotiated autonomy. 
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